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GIFFORD-HILL & CO. v. FTC: DOES NEPA APPLY
TO LAW-ENFORCEMENT ADJUDICATORY
FUNCTIONS OF AN AGENCY?
In Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC,' the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia (per Gasch, J.) held that the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)2 does not apply to the FTC's initiation of
an administrative proceeding to enforce the antitrust laws. Gifford-
Hill, a corporation engaged in the production and sale of construction
materials, had acquired over a five-year period certain concrete
manufacturing and mining concerns. Because of the close relationship
of the acquired companies to Gifford-Hirs business needs, the FTC
decided to challenge these acquisitions as violative of the antitrust
laws.' Although Gifford-Hill availed itself of the FTC's consent order
procedure,4 negotiations floundered over the FTC's demand that Gif-
ford-Hill consent both to a divestiture of one of its acquisitions, Beck-
er Sand & Gravel Co., and to a ten-year prohibition on acquisitions of
similar firms.5 After the FTC issued an administrative complaint,
Gifford-Hill sought a federal court injunction6 against further prose-
1. 1974-2 Trade Cas. f 75,348 (D.D.C., Nov. 14, 1974), appeal docketed, No.
74-2024 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 14, 1974).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
3. The acquired firms included companies which manufactured ready-mixed con-
crete and concrete products, as well as concerns which mined "construction aggregates"
(sand, gravel, etc.). 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,104 & n.6. The FTC alleged that these
mergers violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (an acquisition
of a corporation or its assets which would substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly is forbidden), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (prohibition of unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts
or practices). Administrative Complaint, In re Gifford-Hill & Co., Docket No. 8989
(FTC, Aug. 7, 1974). In reaching its decision to file a complaint, the FTC relied on
its criteria which are enumerated in the FTC's "Enforcement Policy with Respect to
Vertical Mergers in the Cement Industry," released on Jan. 17, 1967. 1 TRADE Rao.
REP. 4520, at 6901 (FTC 1972). See letter from James T. Halverson, Director, FTC
Bureau of Competition, to Robert V. Barnes, Executive Vice President, Gifford-Hill &
Co., on file at the business office of the Duke Law Journal, Durham, North Carolina.
4. 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1974).
5. 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,104.
6. Id. The jurisdiction of the federal district court was invoked pursuant to, inter
alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (federal question jurisdiction). Declaratory relief was
sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). Plaintiff's Verified Complaint for
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cution of the adjudicatory proceeding pending full FTC compliance
with NEPA.7 Specifically, Gifford-Hill alleged that the FTC must es-
tablish appropriate NEPA procedures in regard to its adjudicatory
procedures,8 properly consider environmental issues in relation to the
prosecution of Gifford-Hill,O and file an environmental impact state-
ment with regard to such prosecution. 10 These allegations were but-
tressed by a claim that the enforcement of the FTC's demands might
compel Gifford-Hill to begin its own strip mining operations, with re-
sulting harm to the environment. 1 In denying Gifford-Hill's request
for a preliminary injunction, the court disagreed with the contention
that such environmental damage would necessarily flow from the
FTC's adjudications;' 2 furthermore the entire area of agency law-en-
forcement adjudication was held not to be within the contemplation
of NEPA. 8
NEPA imposes upon federal agencies both substantive and pro-
cedural duties in the interest of preserving and enhancing the nation's
environment.1 4 As a general requirement, the Act announces the fed-
Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief & Mandamus at 3, Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC,
1974-2 Trade Cas. f 75,348 (D.D.C., Nov. 14, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2024
(D.C. Cir., Nov. 14, 1974).
7. 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,103. Gifford-Hill also alleged that the FTC had vi-
olated NEPA by failing to consider and weigh adequately environmental concerns while
it continued to implement the Cement Guidelines, see note 3 supra, and by failing to
file an environmental impact statement for these Guidelines. Plaintiff's Verified Com-
plaint, note 6 supra.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. "The only possible environmental effect suggested by GFH is that it might
be required to mine sand and gravel for its own use if it must rid itself of Becker." Id.
at 98,108.
12. Id.
13. Id. By implication, the court upheld the validity of the FTC regulation exempt-
ing its own enforcement adjudicatory procedures from the NEPA impact statement re-
quirement. 16 C.F.R. § 1.82(d) (1974). That section reads as follows:
Nothing in this procedure shall be construed as stating or implying that
the requirements of section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy
Act apply to: Any investigation made by the Commission for law enforcement
purposes; any process or order issued by the Commission in connection with
any type of investigation; any agreement of voluntary compliance or consent
decree entered into by the Commission; or any adjudicatory proceedings com-
menced by the Commission. Id. (emphasis added).
The Council on Environmental Quality has agreed with the FTC's interpretation
of NEPA. See CEQ Advisory Memorandum, Application of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act to Enforcement of Anti-Trust Laws by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion 10, Jan. 31, 1975, on file at the business office of the Duke Law Journal, Durham,
North Carolina.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970). See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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eral government's responsibility to "use all practicable means, consist-
ent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate federal plans, functions, programs and resources" in
order to effectuate the purposes of the Act.'" To insure performance
of these substantive duties, the Act imposes certain "action-forcing"' 6
procedural obligations' 7 which all federal agencies must observe "to
the fullest extent possible.""' The most general of these requirements
are that agencies use an environmentally oriented approach"9 and that
procedures be developed to insure consideration of environmental
factors.20 Among the specific "action-forcing" procedures, by far the
most important is the requirement that each agency file an environ-
mental impact statement in connection with "every recommendation
or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."' This
statement must be published2 2 and must accompany the government's
proposal through "existing agency review processes." 23  The Act's
broad sweep is further illuminated by the fact that no federal agency
is exempted from its provisions.
Judicial determinations of the applicability of NEPA have fully
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
16. Section 102(2)s procedural requirements were so characterized by Senator
Henry M. Jackson, NEPA's principal sponsor. See Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 & S.
1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116
(1969).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
18. Id. § 4332 (1970). The intent of requiring compliance "to the fullest extent
possible" was to insure that no agency would utilize an excessively narrow construction
of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance. 115 CoNG. Ruc. 40418
(1969); 115 CoNG. REc. 39702-03 (1969). See 1973 CEQ GUIMELwns § 1500.4(a).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (A) (1970) (requiring all agencies to "utilize a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach which will ensure the integrated use of the natural and social
sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and evaluation in decision-mak-
ing which may have an impact on man's environment").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970) (all agencies must "identify and develop meth-
ods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along
with economic and technical considerations"). The word "appropriate" in this section
does not give agencies "broad discretion to downplay environmental factors in their deci-
sion making processes." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109, 1113 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See 1973 CEQ GumIEUEs § 1500.6(c).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). The environmental impact statement is a
"detailed statement" which covers such matters as the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action, unavoidable environmental effects that will occur should the proposal be
implemented, and alternatives to the proposed action which might alter the cost-benefit
equation. Id.
22. The impact statement must be "made available to the President, the Council on
Environmental Quality and to the public.... ".Id.
23. Id.
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recognized the expansive statutory language. The early leading case
of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC2 4 set the tone
for many subsequent decisions in holding that "[the] sweep of NEPA
is extraordinarily broad, compelling consideration of any and all
types of environmental impact of federal action. '25  Relying heavily
upon broad statements in the legislative history,26 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the AEC's narrow
view of what should constitute compliance "to the fullest extent possi-
ble."27 The court's reasoning was that noncompliance should be ex-
cused only in the event of a "clear conflict of statutory authority."23
The general approach exemplified by Calvert Cliffs' has been fol-
lowed in a wide variety of contexts, as courts have almost uniformly
rejected any attempt to interpret the statute's scope as being narrower
than a literal reading would indicate.29 Although no case other than
Gifford-Hill has considered the applicability of NEPA to agency law-
enforcement proceedings, ° several decisions have dealt with other
types of adjudicatory proceedings. These cases have typically con-
cerned agency decisions to authorize nonfederal actions such as the
abandonment of a railway line,31 curtailment of natural gas sales, 2
24. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 1122.
26. 449 F.2d at 1114-15, quoting 115 CONG. Rac. 40,417-18 (1969). See also S.
REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969).
27. 449 F.2d at 1118.
28. Id. at 1115.
29. In Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502
(D.C. Cir. 1974), a case involving the appropriate time for filing a section 102(2)(c)
impact statement with respect to a federal urban renewal project, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had occasion to examine the purpose of NEPA. Despite its holding that
the agency's remedial activities had cured its noncompliance with NEPA, 499 F.2d at
513, the court observed in passing that "NEPA was intended to ensure that decisions
about federal actions would be made only after responsible decisionmakers had fully ad-
verted to the environmental consequences of the actions, and had decided that the public
benefits flowing from the actions outweighed their environmental costs." Id. at 512.
The court has even applied NEPA to projects that were still in the developmental stage.
See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973). NEPA has also been applied to agency proceedings which considered the ap-
proval of private rather than federal action. See cases cited notes 31-35 infra.
30. Judge Gasch characterized Gifford-Hill as a case of first impression because it
was the first time that a litigant had asked the court to apply NEPA to "a law-enforce-
ment adjudicatory proceeding." 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,105.
31. See Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974)
(ICC must decide if impact statement necessary prior to abandonment proceeding; if
necessary it must be prepared before hearings); City of New York v. United States, 337
F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (consideration of NEPA required before ICC could order
abandonment of an entire railroad line).
32. See Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844, 875 (5th Cir. 1974) (where curtailment
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the construction of a power facility,33 construction of a pipeline, 4 or
initiation of a private redevelopment project.35 Judicially created ex-
emptions from the scope of NEPA have been confined to highly un-
usual circumstances. One case exempted orders of the Price Commis-
sion because of the temporary nature of the agency and the necessity
that it make its decisions with dispatch.36 In another case, the need to
follow "expeditious procedures" in ordering an interim curtailment of
natural gas supplies was used to justify an exception to NEPA. 7 The
need for a quick administrative determination was also used to justify
the court's refusal to apply NEPA to regulations promulgated by the
Federal Energy Office.3" Furthermore, courts have refused to compel
the application of NEPA to delay decisions by the Environmental
Protection Agency.3 9
of gas supplies will be permanent, agency "must file best impact statement possible un-
less filing will conflict with a statutory duty"); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. FPC, 488 F.2d 1325, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (FPC should consider the environmental
effects of its decision to award gas supplies to one of two competing gas pipe lines).
33. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972) (Power Authority of the State of New York sought permission to
build high-voltage power transmission line).
34. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973), re-
consideration subsequent to remand, 490 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (denial of certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 717f(c), (e) (1970)).
35. See McLean Gardens Residents Ass'n v. National Capitol Planning Comm'n, 2
ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 20659 (D.D.C., Oct. 21, 1972).
36. Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
37. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1973). In exer-
cising its curtailment power, the FPC is authorized to follow summary procedures; a de-
tailed evaluation of environmental impact would cause delay and would prevent a sum-
mary proceeding. Id. at 150.
38. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974).
39. See Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973). Getty Oil alleged that a compliance order issued by the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency was ultra vires because EPA had
not complied with section 102(2)(c) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). The
court did not believe that EPA is bound by NEPA, and even if NEPA did apply, the
court concluded that Getty Oil should have raised the NEPA issue under section 307
of the Clean Air Act. 467 F.2d at 359.
In Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), the District of Columbia Circuit established a narrow ex-
emption from NEPA applicable to EPA determinations under section 111 of the Clean
Air Act but warned that "NEPA must be accorded full vitality as to non-environmental
agencies . . . ." Id. at 387. Apparently decisive to the court's decision was its recog-
nition that section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires the "functional equivalent of a
NEPA impact statement." id. at 384.
However, Congress has amended the Clean Air Act to clarify that NEPA would
not in the future be applicable to cases like Getty Oil and Portland Cement. Act of
June 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 7(c) (1), 88 Stat. 259, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857
NEPA
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The Gifford-Hill court offered two bases for its decision that the
FTC need not comply with NEPA before prosecuting an administra-
tive complaint against Gifford-Hill. As a general principle, according
to the court, NEPA brings within its scope only those federal actions
with "a reasonably substantial relationship to the quality of the envi-
ronment. '40 This conclusion enabled the court to exempt the case be-
fore it from the operation of NEPA because of the unlikelihood of
any environmental impact resulting from the FTC proceeding. 41 Fur-
thermore, the court held that, even apart from the issue of environ-
mental damage, the nature of FTC law-enforcement proceedings
would remove them from the ambit of NEPA.4s Two broad categories
of federal actions43 were seen as having a sufficient relationship to en-
vironmental quality to be subject to NEPA: (1) actions, such as fed-
eral construction projects, with a "direct federal impact on the envi-
ronment,"44 and (2) actions by nonfederal parties which require
prior federal permission. 45 Because FTC law-enforcement adjudica-
tion belongs to neither group, the court believed that it should be im-
munized from NEPA requirements even if there were possible envi-
ronmental consequences. 46  The court underscored its somewhat
(1970). See generally Note, Applicability of NEPA's Impact Statement Requirement
to the EPA, 1974 DuKE L. 353.
40. 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,107. This conclusion was based both upon "the legis-
lative history of NEPA" and "the case law surrounding the Act." Id.
41. The court found the allegations of possible environmental harm to be "exceed-
ingly speculative," noting that Gifford-Hill would be free to purchase from the company
(Becker Sand and Gravel) it had to sell even after the divestiture. Id. at 98,108. In-
deed, the court concluded that even if the FrC succeeded in divesting Gifford-Hill of
its interest in Becker, such action "is not that sort of action which would have an effect
on the environment." Id. (emphasis added). In any case, the same environmental re-
sult would occur if Gifford-Hill presently decided that it should open more mines and
caused Becker to create them. Thus, Gifford-Hill's "spectre of a possible proliferation
of strip mines around the landscape" did not seem to the court "a very imposing phan-
tom." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 98,107. "NEPA applies to those situations in which 'an agency proposes
to build a facility itself, [and] also whenever an agency makes a decision which permits
action by other parties which will affect the quality of the environment."' Id., citing
Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
44. 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,107 & n.36.
45. Id. at n.37.
46. The court noted that if any environmental impact actually occurred after the
divestiture it would be as the result of "unrelated private action." Id. at 98,109.
Judge Gasch also held that NEPA does not apply to the formulation and continued
use of the "Enforcement Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the Cement In-
dustry," (see supra note 3). Id. at 98,108. In noting that the guidelines represented at
most a statement of the FTC's interpretation of the law, Judge Gasch considered the
guidelines to be no more than a "warning" to the public "about those mergers which
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illogical reliance on the nature of agency action rather than upon en-
vironmental impact by suggesting that NEPA might apply to an FTC
decision to grant approval for a merger 4 7-a hypothetical situation
which would fall within the second of the courts categories.
The two broad categories of federal actions suggested by Judge
Gasch4s can be criticized for their failure to be sufficiently inclusive.
There is at least one reported case that has applied NEPA to a situa-
tion which would not fit within either of the two described categor-
ies. 49 However, one must share the court's doubts that Congress actu-
ally intended NEPA to be used as a shield for continuing violations of
the law; as the court noted, a similar rationale could be used to delay
such administrative actions as an SEC order that a securities law vio-
lator be divested of illegal stockholdings, or an FDA decision to en-
force prohibitions of harmful drugs.50 It is evident that, at the very
least, a substantial question exists as to whether Congress intended
might be deemed improper by the FTC." Id. If the guidelines had been labeled a "pol-
icy" rather than a "warning" it would seem more likely that NEPA would be applicable.
The Council on Environmental Quality has said that "action[s] requirling] the prepara-
tion of an environmental statement. . . include but are not limited to ... [policy,
regulations, and procedure-making." Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting
the Environment, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). Although the CEQ in its Advisory Memo-
randum, supra note 13, at 28, concluded that the guidelines are potentially subject to
the requirement of filing an impact statement, no impact statement was necessary be-
cause "a close inspection of them indicates that specific environmental impacts cannot
be attributed to their continued implementation." Id. at 29. The CEQ Advisory Memo-
randum explained further that "the potential environmental effects [of the guidelines]
are not great, and are clearly not dispositive of whether the FTC should generally pro-
ceed against vertical acquisitions in the cement industry." Id. at 31.
47. 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,108. Because Gifford-Hill had merged in defiance of
the FTC's "Enforcement Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the Cement Indus-
try," supra note 3, the court was unwilling to characterize the proceeding as one where
Gifford-Hill was seeking "permission" after it had accomplished the merger. Id.
The Gifford-Hill court's reasoning would seem to justify exempting any FTC con-
sideration of mergers from NEPA because whatever impact the corporations might have
on the environment as separate entities would likely be the same after they have been
combined to form a new entity.
In its consideration of industrial concentration, the FCC's position is that diversity
of ownership of communications facilities is not a matter which can have any "discerni-
ble impact on the physical environment [and] cannot be held to require preparation of
an impact statement, no matter what social, economic or moral issues may otherwise
be presented." Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; Ter-
mination of Proceeding, Part I, 11, 39 Fed. Reg. 43,834 & 43,836 (1974).
48. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
49. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (student coalition success-
fully enjoined ICC order not to suspend freight surcharge for seven-month period on
ground that ICC had not complied with NEPA).
50. 1974-2 Trade Cas. at 98,108-09. The court regarded such cases as "plainly be-
yond the ambit of NEPA." Id. at 98,109.
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that NEPA should apply to enforcement proceedings of this sort. In
the absence of any legislative history directly on point,51 one must
turn to a consideration of the policies of the Act.52 That the para-
mount purpose of NEPA was to protect the environment is obvious
from even the most casual reading of the statute's introductory sec-
tions announcing the Act's policies.53 However, the same provisions
make it clear that the administration of NEPA is to be "consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy,"54 and in three
decisions55 courts have exempted agencies from NEPA. Speaking of
this issue one court said, "the legislative history of the NEPA inter-
prets [compliance] 'to the fullest extent possible' to mean compliance
unless compliance would give rise to a violation of statutory obliga-
tions."'"0 Since all of these cases involved a statutory duty to reach a
prompt decision, 57 they could be narrowly read to say that "statutory
impossibility" preventing compliance with NEPA will only arise when
the agency must meet a stringent deadline. The cases emphasize how
difficult it is for an agency to justify an exception to NEPA: "the
Commission's duty under the Natural Gas Act to prevent discrimina-
tory practices in times of gas shortage called for prompt action. This
created the type of 'statutory conflict' which alone can excuse compli-
ance with [NEPA's impact statement requirement]." 58  Nevertheless,
these cases which have granted exceptions to NEPA can be given a
broader meaning. In essence, the courts have subordinated the policies
of NEPA to the policies of other programs enacted by Congress.
51. For the legislative history ot: NEPA, see H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2751 et seq. (1969).
52. This conclusion is merely an application of the well-known doctrine that the
policies underlying legislation must be considered if the statutes application is unclear.
See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-98 (1970); District of Columbia v. Or-
leans, 406 F.2d 957, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1968); In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 499,
45 A. 1051, 1053 (1899); 2 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.04
(4th ed. 1972).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
54. Id. § 4331(b) (1970).
55. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1973) (natural gas
shortage necessitates a curtailment process which allows the commission "to act 'now'
and find facts later"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102, 1104-05 (D.D.C.
1974) (FEO administrator directed by Congress to promulgate mandatory oil allocations
within fifteen days of legislation's enactment); Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp.
1236, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (to function effectively, the Price Commission must act
expeditiously).
56. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. See cases cited note 55 supra.
58. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(emphasis added).
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Without speed, these programs could not exist; the courts concluded
that Congress wanted these programs implemented even at the ex-
pense of NEPA. Such an approach is consistent with the language of
NEPA which indicates that the policies and goals of NEPA are "sup-
plementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal
agencies." '59 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that
"NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other stat-
ute." 60 Thus, while the FTC may not be able to argue successfully
that it should be excused from filing impact statements for its adjudi-
catory proceedings because of any unique need for urgency,6' it can
suggest that the application of NEPA would cause a partial repeal of
the statutes under which the FTC operates. This argument assumes
that a case would arise where the environmental impact of an FTC
adjudicatory proceeding was so harmful that the FTC would discon-
tinue its suit. As a result the law would no longer be in effect for those
defendants who could claim that substantial environmental harm
would result if they were sued. This partial repeal could be avoided if
it were assumed that under no set of facts could the environmental
harm ever be substantial enough to stop the FTC from enforcing the
laws for which it has responsibility. However, under this assumption,
the impact statement is predestined to be an exercise in futility, and
the courts will not require the litigant to perform a futile act. Never-
theless, there may be some room for the FTC to consider the environ-
mental impact of its adjudicatory proceedings. Consideration could
be given to this matter when the FTC fashions a remedy. If the FTC
has two or more possible remedies for the violations by a defendant,
then the FTC should consider evidence presented by the parties as to
the potential environmental impact of each potential remedy. With
this information, the FTC would attempt to fashion a remedy consist-
ent with its obligation to enforce the antitrust laws which would at the
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1970).
The effect of this section . . . is to give recognition to the fact that the bill
does not repeal existing law. This section does not, however, obviate the re-
quirement that the Federal agencies conduct their activities in accordance with
the provisions of this bill unless to do so would clearly violate their existing
statutory authorizations. CoNF. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), printed in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2767, 2771 (1969).
60. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973).
61. "Considerations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suf-
fice to strip [NEPAl of its fundamental importance." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In some cases the FTC might be able to argue that its adjudicatory proceedings had
to be concluded promptly because, if they were delayed by an impact statement, the anti-
trust violations could have so weakened the competitors of a violator that the efforts of
the FTC to restore competitiveness might be severely hampered.
NEPA
752 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1975:743
same time produce the least environmental harm.0 2 This approach
would give some recognition to environmental values while at the
same time deterring defendants from using NEPA to postpone the ad-
judication of their alleged violations.
62. The CEQ in its Advisory Memorandum, supra note 13, agrees with this con-
clusion: "While the adversarial nature of the FTC's enforcement proceedings may not
completely substitute for the inquiry that would otherwise occur under [NEPAl, it
does, in our view, yield a 'workable balance between some of the advantages and
disadvantages of full application of NEPA."' Id. at 25 [citation omitted].
